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Abstract: Whether justified in terms of domestic statute, international treaty or customary 
international law, the positivist account of universal jurisdiction rests on rickety and potentially 
ruinous foundations. Common recourse to its ancient underpinnings in the crime of piracy 
demonstrates that, at best, the foundations of universal jurisdiction are in need of modernization. 
The following article discusses four schools of thought about the legitimate aims and interested 
communities that universal jurisdiction is intended to serve. The discussion could be seen as 
tracing the evolution of the principle of universal jurisdiction, from its traditional basis in state 
sovereignty (serving domestic interests) to inter-state comity (serving the interests of the 
community of states) to the idea of the conscience of humanity (serving the interests of the 
international community as a whole), before proposing the idea of universal jurisdiction as a 
human right of access to justice (serving the interests of victims). The discussion takes place 
against the backdrop of a survey of completed universal jurisdiction trials that have taken place 
since the Eichmann trial in 1961. The aim is to understand the source of a domestic court’s 
legitimate authority to exercise universal jurisdiction and thereby reposition discussion of 
universal jurisdiction, a step away from traditional grand narratives to a position more in line 
with contemporary theory and practice. 
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 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For students of law, the question of a court’s ‘jurisdiction’ can often seem prosaic 
and technical. The question of jurisdiction is most often regarded as a preliminary 
issue, to be disposed of before moving to the heart of the case. Yet, in a world of 
rival jurisdictions, questions of jurisdiction can disguise what is, in essence, a mode 
of political engagement. Acceptance or dismissal of a case on ‘jurisdictional grounds’ 
can mask a violent political contest, imposing a particular form of political authority 
on others or denying recognition to rival claims to authority.1 The problem is that 
the ritual performance of jurisdiction in the case of rival claims can lead judges and 
other legal actors to make the assumption that, so long as ‘normal’ rules are applied 
in court, the legal process can escape the political conflicts of a pluralistic society. 
The aim of this article is to focus judicial attention on the (contestable) claim to 
authority inherent in jurisdictional claims, inviting consideration of the purpose and 
beneficiaries of judicial authority, not as a mere preparatory issue, but as an 
omnipresent question for a court.  
 The case for rethinking judicial means and modes is particularly strong in the 
context of claims by states to exercise universal jurisdiction. On 3 August 2016, a 
verdict handed down in an English courtroom made front page news in Nepal, 
though was barely reported in the UK press.2 The trial of Kumar Lama, a colonel 
in the Royal Nepalese Army, took place in the Old Bailey in London from June to 
July 2016. Colonel Lama was charged with two counts of torture under section 134 
of the Criminal Justice Act, relating to incidents that had allegedly occurred between 
April and May 2005 at the Gorusinghe Army Barracks in Nepal.3 The Criminal 
Justice Act vests British courts with ‘universal jurisdiction’ over the offence of 
torture, meaning the offence can be prosecuted in the UK whatever the nationality 
of the offender and wherever the alleged torture was committed. Little mention was 
made of the jurisdictional basis at trial, save for the Prosecutor’s acknowledgement 
to the jury in his opening that ‘this trial in a far-off land may seem a bit alien’. When 
the term ‘universal jurisdiction’ was mentioned in passing during the questioning of 
a witness on Day 9 of the trial, a juror passed up a note asking the judge to explain 
its meaning. The judge explained that while usually jurisdiction of courts is confined 
to geographical territory, universal jurisdiction means there are certain crimes that 
any court can prosecute regardless of where they happened and that ‘torture is one 
of those’. The parties had nothing to add. For the presiding judge, and indeed the 
parties, the question of the court’s jurisdiction, being based in statute, was 
                                                      
1 Pahuja, ‘Laws of Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account of International Law’, 1(1) London Review of 
International Law (2013) 63; S. Dorsett and S. McVeigh, Jurisdiction (2012). 
2 In the UK print news, the one exception was a story appearing on page 12 of the Times newspaper.  
3 The author observed the trial. All quotes are based on notes taken at trial (on file with the author). 
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uncontroversial and merited little attention. It was nevertheless with some 
consternation that the judge told the jury at the end of the trial, ‘it is relatively rare 
for so many witnesses to require interpreters and indeed for so many problems to 
arise in one case’. 
 The concern driving this article is that the question of jurisdiction is not simply 
something to be ‘disposed of’, particularly in cases implicating rival claims to 
authority. In such cases, jurisdiction is appropriately a question that should orient, 
inform and influence the entire trial and its conduct. To orient oneself through 
jurisdiction is to give primacy to questions of authority and to how the authorisation 
of lawful relations takes place.4 While the idea that jurisdiction is an exercise of 
authority may seem obvious, the article invites attention to the ‘claim’ inherent 
within it, particularly where the exercise of jurisdiction intrudes upon or displaces 
competing claims. Jurisdictional thinking invites attention to the need for those 
asserting such a claim to take responsibility for these claims to authority, 
encouraging responsiveness to the normative communities such claims put into 
relation and the potential need to rethink conventional modes of operation. As 
Dorsett and McVeigh observe, ‘[t]hinking with jurisdiction invites more concern 
with means than with ultimate ends’.5  
 The aim of this article is to flesh out the implications of seeing universal 
jurisdiction as a claim to authority. Legal scholars and practitioners tend to focus on 
the legal source of authority to exercise universal jurisdiction. The consequence is a 
tendency to think in binary terms: a court either has jurisdiction, in which case the 
matter will proceed (without further attention to the question of the court’s 
jurisdiction), or it does not, in which case the matter itself is at an end. Yet, by 
reducing the question of universal jurisdiction to an is/is not dichotomy, positivism 
proves itself to be an inarticulate code of conduct. Law is effective at telling us ‘what’ 
to do, or ‘what’ not to do, though less effective at telling us ‘how’, ‘why’ or on 
‘whose’ behalf.6 In relation to universal jurisdiction, understanding its legitimate aim 
(the ‘why’) will have implications for the ‘how’, including evidentiary and procedural 
rules and ensuring that any limitations placed upon its scope are proportionate in 
terms of the aim these limitations pursue. The question ‘on whose behalf’ is 
particularly pertinent in this context as it alerts us to the notion that universal 
jurisdiction, by its nature, does not operate within the parameters of an existing, 
bounded or defined jurisdictional community. The boundaries of authority are not 
settled, but emerging. The aim of this article is to focus the legal mind more sharply 
around the implications of seeing universal jurisdiction as a claim to authority. In 
Part I, I examine the deficiencies in the dominant ‘legal source’ narrative on 
universal jurisdiction. In Part II, I assess the value of understanding the legal-
political dimension of universal jurisdiction as a claim to authority that must be 
                                                      
4 Goodrich, ‘Visive Powers: Colours, Trees and Genres of Jurisdiction’ 2(2) Law and Humanities (2008),  
5 Dorsett and McVeigh, supra note 1, at 23. 
6 J. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (1964), at 1; L. Fuller, Law in Quest of Itself (1966), at 65. 
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understood, and justified, with attention to its purpose and the community(ies) it is 
intended to serve. 
 
 
I. SOURCE AS ARTIFICE: UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND 
POSITIVISM 
 
It is natural and appropriate that judges and legal scholars commonly address the 
question of jurisdiction by looking to its legal source. Law is a source-based 
enterprise.7 Case law and influential scholarship reflect that the establishment of 
universal jurisdiction is most often centred around an inquiry as to whether the 
principle exists in positive law, either domestic or international.8 An appeal to 
positive law enables a claim to objectivity on the basis that the law applied is 
developed with the consent of the domestic legislature (domestic law) or domestic 
executive in association with the community of states (international law). As Kevin 
Heller decreed in in his recent study of the nature of international crimes, ‘[f]or good 
or for ill, we are (almost) all positivists now’.9 
 According to a positivist analysis, the valid law of a community is identifiable 
based on its source and not its content – its ‘pedigree’, as Dworkin put it, in a 
recognised authoritative source.10 The sources of law are not boundless, but are 
defined within a ‘legal system’, a term H.L.A. Hart used as short-hand to refer ‘to a 
number of heterogeneous social facts’ that operate ‘in a given country or among a 
given social group’.11 Positivists would accept that law developed within the 
parameters of the Nepalese legal system would not be authoritative in English courts 
because the social facts underwriting the validity of Nepalese law differ from those 
underwriting the validity of English law. Legal communities are neither transferable 
nor interchangeable. Following this logic, difficulty emerges when we try to justify 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction using a positivist hermeneutic. When we take 
off our positivist blinkers and look at the social facts, it becomes apparent that the 
boundaries of the relevant legal community on behalf of whom or in respect of 
                                                      
7 Schauer, ‘Law’s Boundaries’, 130 Harvard Law Review (2017) 2434, at 2435-6. 
8 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), Joint Separate Opinion 
of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 3; L Reydams, Universal 
Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (2004), 4 (‘Content and Methodology’); M Cosnard, 
‘La compétence universelle en matière pénale’, in C Tomuschat and J-M Thouvenin, eds, The Fundamental 
Rules of the International Legal Order. Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes(2006) 361, 364; Kenneth Randall, 
‘Universal Jurisdiction under International Law’ (1987-1988) 66 Texas Law Review 785, Pt IV; M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, ‘The History of Universal Jurisdiction and its Place in International Law’ in S. Macedo (ed.), 
Universal Jurisdiction and the National Prosecution of Serious Crimes , at 39. 
9 Heller, ‘What is an International Crime? (A Revisionist History)’ 58(2) Harvard International Law Journal, 
at 66 (SSRN draft). 
10 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), 17; H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed), 264 
11 Hart, 112. 
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which universal jurisdiction is exercised are far from clear. To explain the problem 
in more concrete terms, it is helpful to turn to the sources relied upon by courts to 
justify the exercise of universal jurisdiction in respect of foreign torture.  
 
1. DOMESTIC LAW 
 
In both trials conducted in the UK to date, it was accepted without further challenge 
that universal jurisdiction in respect of torture was clearly vested by a UK statute.12 
Indeed, section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act provides that ‘[a] public 
official…whatever his nationality, commits the offence of torture if in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere he intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on another 
in the performance or purported performance of his official duties’.  
 One of the preliminary challenges posed by this article is whether it is adequate 
to regard the issue as settled by positive domestic law. The challenge here is not to 
the decision to accept jurisdiction on the basis of a domestic statute, but to the 
notion that this statutory basis can ever in itself be an adequate justification. When 
an English judge asserts jurisdiction over a foreign national alleged to have 
committed a crime with no connection to the UK, is there not something 
objectionable about regarding this as a matter over which the domestic court (or 
legislature) can claim to be the single objective authority? It is clear that the claim to 
universal jurisdiction is not made against those within the domestic legal 
community, but is a claim to authority in relation to states, individuals and normative 
communities external to it. There seems little foundation for the assumption that 
judges can shield themselves or their courtrooms from the normal political conflicts 
of a pluralistic society.13 The effect of the positivist analysis is to fence legal thinking 
off from the developing social and political context within which it is intended to 
apply. Judges are not mindless bureaucrats or mere conveyer belts of domestic 
legislative mandates incapable of understanding the broader normative context 
within which they operate.14 The challenge of the modern world is that such a claim 
to authority, where exercised in an insular way, risks confusing domestic statutory 
interpretation with political domination.15 The objectivity at the heart of the 
positivist analysis threatens to become specious where it is used as a device to enable 
one legal community to impose its laws upon another. Creating legal justification in 
this context requires not merely an insular commitment, but objectification of that 
to which one is committed.16  
 
 
 
                                                      
12 R v Faryadi Sawar Zardad [2007] EWCA Crim 279 (7 February 2007); R v Kumar Lama (Central Criminal 
Court, London). 
13 Shklar, supra note 6, at xiii. 
14 J. Stone, Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasoning (1964), at 209–98; L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (1968), at 94. 
15 Cover, ‘Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’, 97(4) Harvard Law Review (1983) 4, at 43. 
16 Ibid., at 45. 
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2.INTERNATIONAL TREATY LAW 
 
The positivist international lawyer might argue that such objectification can be 
found in international law. Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act is not a 
contrivance of the British Parliament, but was enacted to implement the UK’s 
obligations under the Convention Against Torture. A range of treaties, including 
those related to counterfeiting, drug-trafficking, safety of UN personnel, the 
financing of terrorism and torture, include an obligation upon member states to 
‘prosecute or extradite’ individuals found in their territory for certain offences 
regardless of the nationality of the offender or location of the crime.17 Yet is the fact 
of entering into a treaty in itself adequate to justify taking jurisdiction over persons 
and conduct with no connection to the prosecuting state?  
 One basis of justification is that all states parties to the relevant treaties have 
effectively consented to the exercise of jurisdiction in the event that an offence 
covered by the treaty is committed by their nationals or within their territory. 
However, it is notable that, in enforcing such provisions, the question as to whether 
the state of nationality or state in whose territory the alleged offence occurred is a 
state party to the relevant treaty does not appear to be a material question. For 
example, in the Pinochet case, where the UK was considering the extent of its 
jurisdiction to prosecute former Chilean head of state Augusto Pinochet, the UK 
House of Lords gave no attention to when or whether Chile had ratified the 
Convention Against Torture.18 In Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or 
Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), the International Court of Justice upheld Belgium’s claim 
that Senegal was obliged under the Convention Against Torture to prosecute the 
former President of Chad, Hissène Habré, for alleged acts committed since the 
Convention entered into force for Senegal, without consideration of when or 
whether Chad itself had ratified the Convention.19  
 Some may argue that the fault here lies not with positivism, but with the courts’ 
misguided application of it, such that both courts were wrong not to consider 
whether the state of nationality or territoriality had consented to the third state’s 
assumption of jurisdiction. Even taking this argument into account (an argument 
that contemplates a fairly significant oversight by both the International Court of 
Justice and the UK House of Lords), surely we miss something fundamental about 
the principle of universal jurisdiction if we conflate it simply with delegated 
                                                      
17 For a full list of treaty provisions, see Annex to UN Secretary-General, ‘Survey of multilateral 
conventions which may be of relevance for the work of the International Law Commission on the topic 
“The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)”, UN Doc A/CN.4/630 (18 June 2010). 
18 Chile ratified the Convention Against Torture on 30 September 1988. The willingness of the UK 
House of Lords to exercise jurisdiction over conduct committed on 29 September 1988 demonstrates 
that Chile’s consent was not considered pertinent. (What a difference a day makes). 
19 Judgment, 20 July 2012, ICJ Reports 422, at [102]. 
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jurisdiction. For example, if Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Somalia, Taiwan and the 
Philippines were to enter into a treaty agreeing to prosecute anyone found in their 
territory suspected of adultery regardless of the nationality of the offender or the 
state in which the conduct occurred, would the existence of the treaty obligation 
between these states render the prosecution of a UK citizen for adultery committed 
in the UK justifiable? One is tempted to answer ‘no’. However, the only basis upon 
which we can distinguish this from the torture example is by looking to the 
underlying nature of the crime. The source of jurisdiction does not derive ultimately 
from the treaty obligation, but from a deeper sense that certain crimes are justifiably 
of broader concern such that third states are justified in prosecuting them. Tellingly, 
even Kevin Heller (cited previously) acknowledges the ‘disquieting idea that no 
conception of an international crime…may be able to completely escape the spectre 
of naturalism’.20   
 
3.CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The positivist argument proves limited, not only in providing justification for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, but also in any determination that its exercise is 
not justified. While the stability of the positivist foundations of universal jurisdiction 
in domestic statute or international treaty law are open to question, the real 
problems for the positivist analysis occur in the absence of such foundations where 
it becomes necessary to rely on alternative sources of law. Notable treaty 
codification gaps exist in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity, in relation 
to which there are no treaty provisions imposing an obligation on states to exercise 
universal jurisdiction. According to the positivist analysis, customary international 
law here serves to provide the general default rules.21  
 The problem is that universal jurisdiction and customary international law are 
uneasy bedfellows. As is well known, in the Arrest Warrant case before the 
International Court of Justice, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
conducted a textbook positivist survey of national legislation, case law, treaties and 
the writings of eminent jurists to determine whether the principle of universal 
jurisdiction existed under customary international law. The result of their 
‘dispassionate analysis of State practice and Court decisions’ was that ‘no general 
rule of positive international law can as yet be asserted’ and that ‘the only clear 
example of an agreed exercise of universal jurisdiction was in respect of piracy’.22 
The customary international law yardstick – requiring proof of state practice and 
opinio juris, where the relevant state practice must be ‘widespread and representative, 
                                                      
20 Heller, ‘What is an International Crime? (A Revisionist History)’ 58(2) Harvard International Law Journal, 
at 66 (SSRN draft), at 4. 
21 Fourth Restatement, Commentary to § 211, 43. 
22 Arrest Warrant case, supra note 8, Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal at 
[44], [52] and [54]. See also Separate Opinion of President Guillaume, at [5], [12]. 
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as well as consistent’23 – proves a difficult measure in the case of universal 
jurisdiction. 
 In their review of the writings of eminent jurists, many of whom declared 
universal jurisdiction to be a principle of customary international law, Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal (in a polite though clear rebuke) remarked that 
these writings ‘important and stimulating as they may be’ ‘cannot serve to 
substantiate an international practice where virtually none exists’.24 Nevertheless, 
some fifteen years after they issued this opinion, the tide of legal scholarship is once 
again turning toward recognition of universal jurisdiction as a principle of customary 
international law.25 One scholar writing in the 2014 edition of a leading textbook 
declares that ‘[u]niversal jurisdiction has undergone something of a renaissance in 
recent years’.26 Yet has state practice changed so markedly since the Arrest Warrant 
case? According to my own survey, the results of which are tabulated at the end of 
this article, there have been a total of 52 completed universal jurisdiction trials 
world-wide since the Eichmann trial in 1961. Universal jurisdiction trials have run to 
completion in only 16 states, 15 of which are in the ‘Western European and Others’ 
regional grouping, hardly reflective of a representative international practice.27 It is 
also significant that over 30 of the 52 completed trials involve prosecutions for war 
crimes and torture, with the judgments in these trials reflecting that jurisdiction was 
exercised pursuant to domestic legislation implementing a treaty ‘obligation to 
prosecute’ rather than a belief that the right to exercise universal jurisdiction exists 
independently under customary international law.28 
                                                      
23 ‘Text of the draft conclusions on identification of customary international law adopted by the 
Commission’, Conclusion 8, Report of the International Law Commission at its 68th Session, UN Doc A/71/10 
(2016), at 77.   
24 Arrest Warrant case, supra note 8, at [44]. 
25 Fourth restatement on Foreign Relations Law (2017), d217; R. Cryer et al, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (2010), at 51; Colangelo, ‘The Legal Limits of Universal 
Jurisdiction’, 47 Virginia Journal of International Law (2006-2007), at 151-2; Claus Kreß, ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit International’, 4 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 561, 562, 576 (2006)); Institut de droit international, ‘Universal jurisdiction with respect to 
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’ (2005), at [2]; Cassese, ‘Is the Bell Tolling 
for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction’ 1 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2003) 589, at 591-592. 
26 Staker, ‘Jurisdiction’ in M. Evans, International Law (4th ed, 2014), at 322. 
27 See Appendix for list of states. It is notable that the only state falling outside this group, Senegal, was 
pressured into exercising universal jurisdiction when Belgium (a WEOG state) took it to the International 
Court of Justice to enforce the obligation to prosecute: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or 
Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) Judgment, 20 July 2012, ICJ Reports 422. 
28 Indeed, in two cases in which courts accepted jurisdiction over war crimes charges, they declined 
jurisdiction over genocide charges on the express basis there was no relevant treaty obligation: District 
Court of the Hague, Public Prosecutor v Joseph Mpambara, Interlocutory Decision of 24 July 2007, Case No 
09/750009-06 and 09/750007-07; Swiss Tribunal Militaire de Cassation, Niyonteze v Public Prosecutor, 27 
April 2001, discussed in Reydams, Niyonteze v Public Prosecutor, 96(1) American Journal of International Law 
(2002) 231. It is interesting that, even in those cases where the relevant courts accepted jurisdiction to 
decide genocide charges, some courts sought a treaty basis, with the Austrian Supreme Court finding 
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 In 2012, a survey of national legislation by Amnesty International reported that 
‘147 (approximately 76.2%) out of 193 states have provided for universal 
jurisdiction’ over either genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or torture.29 
While this statistic suggests widespread acceptance of universal jurisdiction, it also 
fails to record the significant limitations built into domestic legislation, which affects 
the consistency of the practice. It is interesting to compare the Amnesty survey 
results to the notes submitted by 57 states to the UN Secretary-General in 
connection with the General Assembly’s consideration of the topic ‘the scope and 
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction’, which has been an annual item 
on the agenda of the Sixth Committee since 2010.30 These notes reveal that, of the 
55 states in relation to which Amnesty recorded legislative support for universal 
jurisdiction over one or more crimes, almost half of them make the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction conditional on authorisation by a governmental or state 
official, including in some cases the Attorney-General, Minister of Justice or 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.31 In such cases, it is relevant in reviewing state practice 
to assess the number of cases in which official authorisation is granted and the 
reasons for which it is refused. The Amnesty survey also fails to articulate the basis 
for the national legislation. According to Kevin Heller’s assessment of the Amnesty 
survey, 65 of the states who have implemented legislative acceptance of universal 
jurisdiction only do so when formally required to do so by a treaty.32 A curious 
aspect of the survey is its recognition that 91 states have provided their courts with 
universal jurisdiction over ordinary crimes, including assault. Yet there is no 
question, for example, that international law recognises universal jurisdiction in 
relation to assault. The purpose for which states recognise universal jurisdiction is 
significant in defining its scope. The lack of detail in the legislative survey renders it 
a blunt tool by which to forge customary international law.  
 Essentially, the customary international law inquiry creates at least two 
problems in the case of universal jurisdiction. First, the exercise of universal 
                                                      
jurisdiction in the ‘object and purpose’ of the Genocide Convention: see Dusko Cvjetkovic, Beschluss des 
Obersten Gerichtshofs Os 9994-6 (13 July 1994) discussed in Marschik, ‘European National Approaches 
to War Crimes’ in T. MacCormack and G. Simpson, The Law of War Crimes: National and International 
Approaches (1997). In French law, jurisdiction over genocide and crimes against humanity cases was based 
on the need to bring French law into line with the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda: Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, ‘The scope and application of the principle 
of universal jurisdiction’, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/France_E.pdf. 
29 Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around the World: 2012 
Update (2012). 
30 The state notes submitted to the UN Secretary-General are available under Agenda Item 86 for each 
session of the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly. For example, the notes submitted at the 
75th session are available here: http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri.shtml.   
31 For example, state notes evidence requirements for the consent or authorisation of the Attorney-General 
(Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, United Kingdom); Minister of Justice (Iraq, Italy, Malta); Minister 
of Foreign Affairs (Lithuania); Director of Public Prosecutions or Federal Prosecutor (Belgium, Botswana, 
Cameroon, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Norway, Spain, United States); the 
Government (Sweden) or an official request from the territorial state in which the crime was committed 
(Azerbaijan, Cuba). 
32 Heller, supra note 9, Appendix. 
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jurisdiction is, by definition, a default jurisdiction and, far from being customary, is 
and should be rare. Secondly, universal jurisdiction is a mechanism intended, not to 
promote state interests, but to disrupt state machinery where state officials act 
contrary to certain fundamental norms. Given universal jurisdiction is generally 
practised against state officials, it will attract reluctance by state officials to approve 
its exercise and opposition from state officials against whom it is exercised. Both 
these factors heighten the paradox that exists in any event in relation to the creation 
of custom. Any rule navigating the difficult path from ‘becoming’ to ‘being’ faces 
the paradox that customary legal rules will only be recognised where a critical mass 
of states are willing to engage in practice, but that – until the point it achieves such 
widespread acceptance – such practice is unsupported by law.33 This paradox is 
complicated further where we must rely chiefly on judicial organs to provide the 
state practice: until courts engage in the practice, it will not be lawful; yet, as long as 
the practice it is not lawful, courts will not engage in the practice. As Hannah Arendt 
notes, ‘[i]n consequence of this unfinished nature of international law, it has become 
the task of ordinary trial judges to render justice without the help of or beyond the 
limitation set upon them through positive posited laws. For the judge, this may be 
a predicament’.34  
 It is interesting that in the Eichmann case, one of the very few cases in which a 
domestic court has expressly relied on universal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of 
Israel rejected the utility of positivism, declaring that ‘the rules of the Law of Nations 
are not derived solely from international treaties and from crystallised international 
usage’.35 Quoting from a number of scholars, including Hersch Lauterpacht, Julius 
Stone, Sheldon Glueck and Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Supreme Court reflected 
the position that ‘[d]uring the early stage (or a particularly disturbed stage) of any 
system of law – and international law is still in a relatively undeveloped state – the 
courts must rely a great deal upon non-legislative law’ and ‘may proceed…by a 
consideration of the larger needs of the international community’.36 The ‘is/is not’ 
dichotomy that is the hallmark of the positivist hermeneutic does not easily 
accommodate the phase in international law between ‘becoming’ and ‘being’. To the 
extent it is necessary to rely on customary international law for justification, 
universal jurisdiction threatens to remain a promise that is perpetually 
unredeemable. 
 
 
 
                                                      
33 ‘Every recognition of custom as evidence of law must have a beginning some time’: Glueck, ‘The 
Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War’ 59 Harvard Law Review (1946) 396, at 418. 
34 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), at 274.  
35 Supreme Court of Israel, AG v Eichmann, 36 ILR 28, [11]. 
36 Ibid. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
The above discussion is not intended to undermine the importance of the positivist 
inquiry into the valid legal source of a domestic court’s jurisdiction. This is far from 
an appeal to judges to ignore prescribed jurisdictional boundaries. Rather, the intent 
is to expose the limitations of a purely positivist approach to jurisdiction by judges 
and practitioners in universal jurisdiction cases. As a legal tradition developed on 
the basis of traditional notions of sovereignty, positivism serves as a ‘conservatizing 
institution’ working to reinforce an inherent preference for existing state authority 
and structures.37 However, in many respects, universal jurisdiction challenges the 
traditional positivist parameters of state sovereignty and state authority. While the 
positivist architecture is built on the foundations of a defined political community, 
universal jurisdiction throws into question the very issue as to what the boundaries 
of political community are. Does a court exercising universal jurisdiction derive its 
authority from the domestic community within which its acts? The community of 
states? The international community more broadly? Or individuals within the 
community of the foreign state in relation to which it acts? A court claiming to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over a foreign state official in relation to an offence 
that bears no direct relation to the prosecuting state does not operate above the 
political world, but in its very midst.38 Here, the question of the justification of this 
authority assumes broader significance, with potential normative and institutional 
design implications. 
 
 
II. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AS A CLAIM TO AUTHORITY 
 
The value of a fresh inquiry into the notion of jurisdiction in light of shifting notions 
of state sovereignty has been recognised by leading practitioners and scholars. Sir 
Daniel Bethlehem, former UK Foreign Office Legal Adviser, has criticised current 
concepts of jurisdiction as ‘rooted in analyses of the 1930s that have developed little 
since then’.39 His invitation is to reconceive notions of jurisdiction ‘beyond 
geography and towards purpose’.40 David Luban equally resists traditional notions 
of jurisdiction, defining jurisdiction as ‘the study of the interests that create a 
legitimate stake in prescribing and enforcing the law’.41 Both descriptions focus 
attention on the purpose and interests served by the exercise of jurisdiction.  
 Whether justified in terms of domestic statute, international treaty or 
customary international law, universal jurisdiction rests on shaky foundations. 
Despite common recourse to ancient underpinnings in the crime of piracy, the 
                                                      
37 Shklar, supra note 6, at 10. 
38 G. Simpson, Law, War and Crime (2007), Chapter 1. 
39 D. Bethlehem, ‘The End of Geography: The Changing Nature of the International System and the 
Challenge to International Law’ 25(1) European Journal of International Law (2014) 9, at 22. 
40 Ibid., at 22. 
41 Luban, ‘A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity’ 29 Yale Journal of International Law (2004) 85, at 139, at 
91. 
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foundations of universal jurisdiction are clearly in need of modernisation. In the 
following section, I discuss four schools of thought about the legitimate aims and 
interested communities that universal jurisdiction is intended to serve. The 
discussion could be seen as tracing the evolution of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, from its traditional basis in state sovereignty (serving domestic interests) 
to inter-state comity (serving the interests of the community of states) to the idea of 
the conscience of humanity (serving the interests of the international community as 
a whole), before proposing the idea of universal jurisdiction as a human right of 
access to justice (serving the interests of victims). The discussion takes place against 
the backdrop of a survey of completed universal jurisdiction trials that have taken 
place since the Eichmann trial in 1961. The aim is to understand the source of a 
domestic court’s legitimate authority to exercise universal jurisdiction and thereby 
reposition discussion of universal jurisdiction, a step away from traditional grand 
narratives to a position more in line with contemporary theory and practice.  
 
1.UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AS SOVEREIGNTY (DOMESTIC 
COMMUNITY) 
 
According to classical doctrine, jurisdiction is regarded as an ‘aspect’ or 
‘manifestation’ of sovereignty.42 Sovereignty flows from statehood, which in turn is 
connected to control over territory.43 Oppenheim’s first edition, published in 1905, 
noted that ‘states possessing independence and territorial as well as personal 
supremacy can naturally extend or restrict their jurisdiction as far as they like’.44 At 
the height of this approach in the Lotus case, the Permanent Court of Justice 
declared that a state’s jurisdiction was essentially discretionary, such that ‘all that can 
be required of a State is that it should not overstep its limits which international law 
places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its 
sovereignty’.45 
 With the passage of time, this expansive view of sovereignty has been 
overtaken by other tendencies.46 A more recent edition of Oppenheim recognises 
that states’ rights are not ‘unlimited’ and that ‘[a]lthough there are extensive areas in 
which international law accords to states a large degree of freedom of action…it is 
important that freedom is derived from a legal right and not from an assertion of 
                                                      
42 C. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd ed., 2015), [1.3]; J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public 
International Law (8th ed., 2012), 456; D.W. Bowett, ‘Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority Over 
Activities and Resources’, 53 British Yearbook of International Law (1982) 1, 1. 
43 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands/USA), Award of Tribunal (Max Huber), 4 April 1928, RIAA II, at 
838. 
44 L. Oppenheim, International Law (1st ed, 1905), ch 1, s.143. 
45 The Case of S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey), Judgment of 7 September 1927, P.C.I.J. Ser. A No. 10, at 19 (my 
emphasis). 
46 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 8, at [51] per Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal. 
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unlimited will, and is subject ultimately to regulation within the legal framework of 
the international community’.47 The problem with the Lotus approach was that it 
emphasised the sovereign rights of the state exercising jurisdiction without taking 
account of the adverse effects of the jurisdictional assertion upon other states.48 The 
effect was to leave resolution of conflicting jurisdictions to extra-legal factors, 
principal among these being the relative power of concerned states’.49 The 
contemporary focus of jurisdictional principles is therefore on the ‘allocation of 
competence’ between states who might potentially claim jurisdiction – without 
which, as Rosalyn Higgins declaims, ‘all is rancour and chaos’.50 
 Instead of recognising plenary jurisdiction as an aspect of sovereignty, 
contemporary international law on jurisdiction requires states to identify some form 
of sovereign nexus between the case over which jurisdiction is asserted and the state 
asserting jurisdiction. According to accepted contemporary doctrine, jurisdiction is 
understood as the rightful authority to speak the law within a state’s territory where 
there is ‘a genuine connection between the subject-matter of jurisdiction and the 
territorial base or reasonable interests of the state in question’.51 Rather than 
recognising a right to exercise jurisdiction unless prohibited by international law, 
international law now recognises a number of permissive principles. It is well 
accepted that states may claim jurisdiction over crimes committed on their territory 
or by their nationals (‘territoriality’ or ‘nationality’ jurisdiction), and there is further 
support for jurisdictional principles that entitle states to claim jurisdiction where 
their nationals have been victims of a crime (‘passive personality’ jurisdiction) or 
fundamental state interests are threatened (‘protective’ jurisdiction).52  
 If jurisdiction is founded in some nexus to state sovereignty, the justification 
threatens to become unhinged in claims to exercise ‘universal jurisdiction’. Here, the 
absence of sovereign nexus is immanent in its very definition. According to the 
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, ‘universal jurisdiction is criminal 
jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the 
crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the 
nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such 
jurisdiction’.53 Justifying universal jurisdiction on the basis of sovereignty is 
unpersuasive and arguably provokes unnatural contortions of both principles. For 
example, in a courageous effort to reconcile universal jurisdiction and sovereignty, 
Anthony Sammons makes the argument that, when heinous crimes occur on a 
state’s territory, the territorial state cedes some of its sovereignty to the international 
                                                      
47 R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed., vol. 1, 1992), at 12. 
48 C. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2008), at 6. 
49 Mills, ‘Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law’ 84(1) British Yearbook of International Law (2014) 187, 
at 193. 
50 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994), at 56. 
51 Crawford, supra note 42, at 456. See also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed. 
1998), at 303. 
52 Crawford, supra note 42, at 457-464. 
53 The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (2001), available at 
https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf. 
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community and becomes, in effect, terra nullius for the purposes of criminal 
jurisdiction.54  
 We might interpret the ‘no safe haven’ justification sometimes given for 
universal jurisdiction as a justification based on sovereign nexus. Under the ‘no safe 
haven’ universal jurisdiction conception, states may exercise universal jurisdiction 
to avoid becoming a refuge for participants in core international crimes. This may 
be interpreted as an exercise of jurisdiction that responds primarily to a domestic 
interest to keep out ‘undesirables’. For example, in the 1980s, commissions of 
inquiry were established in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom in response 
to widespread domestic public concern that Nazi war criminals had gained 
admittance to these countries and were living there.55 In the case of Australia and 
Canada, the allegation was that domestic governmental officials had been complicit 
in enabling their entry. In each case, one response was to enact legislation to enable 
domestic courts to prosecute Nazi war crimes. In more recent times, fear of 
terrorists (including ISIS members) entering states pretending to be refugees has 
intensified among domestic populations. States are assisted in their capacity to 
prevent this by Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, which provides a right to 
states to deny refugee status to individuals where there are serious reasons for 
considering that they have committed a crime against the peace, a war crime or a 
crime against humanity.56 It follows that an increasing connection has developed 
between the processing of asylum applications and war crimes investigations. Some 
states such as the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom have developed 
formal arrangements for notification and cooperation between immigration 
authorities and prosecutorial authorities.57 
 However, it is one thing to recognise this connection between immigration and 
prosecution, and quite another to conflate the functions of domestic immigration 
restrictions and universal jurisdiction prosecutions. It is not appropriate to regard 
the ‘no safe haven’ justification as primarily responsive to domestic concerns. 
Deportation would be the obvious solution for a state simply wishing to ensure 
those suspected of international crimes were denied entry to or residence in a state. 
Indeed, this was the approach taken by the United States in the Demjanjuk case, 
                                                      
54 Anthony Sammons, ‘The Under-theorization of Universal Jurisdiction’ 21 Berkeley Journal of International 
Law (2003) 111. 
55 A Menzies, Review of Material Relating to the Entry of Suspected War Criminals into Australia (1987) 
(Australia); J. Deschênes, Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals (1986) (Canada), available at 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/bcp-pco/CP32-52-1986-1-eng.pdf; T. 
Hetherington and W. Chalmers, Report of the War Crimes Inquiry (1989) (UK). 
56 Exclusion under Article 1 F does not require any preceding conviction under criminal law: A. 
Zimmerman, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (2011), at 
592. 
57 Human Rights Watch, ‘Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: State of the Art’ (27 June 2006), 7 available at 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/06/27/universal-jurisdiction-europe/state-art.  
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where the strategy of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service was to deploy 
evidence supplied by Israeli investigators that John Demjanjuk was a Nazi 
collaborator to denaturalise him, then deport him.58 In circumstances where states 
opt to prosecute on the basis of universal jurisdiction rather than deport, it is 
difficult to construe this primarily in terms of domestic interests. A successful 
conviction has the potential to have the converse effect to deportation, leading to 
the accused being imprisoned in the prosecuting state at the taxpayer’s expense, 
potentially for life, while the risk of an unsuccessful prosecution is that recourse to 
Article 1F may no longer be available.59 In the case of Nazi war crimes prosecutions, 
the reports and official statements reflect that the relevant states were prompted to 
act, not in response to any effects within or upon domestic constituencies, but 
because they shared ‘the abhorrence felt by all civilised nations for the serious 
criminal activities committed in the course of the Second World War’60 and that 
such crimes are ‘so monstrous they cannot be condoned’.61 In the case of the UK, 
the concern was that failure to take action would ‘taint the United Kingdom with 
the slur of being a haven for war criminals’.62 The concern was not so much with 
the domestic audience, but with an international one. Scholars such as Máximo 
Langer express the clear view that prosecuting states exercising ‘no safe haven’ 
jurisdiction do so as a representative of the international and not the domestic 
community.63 
 Ultimately, the problem with sourcing universal jurisdiction in sovereignty rests 
in the fact that sovereignty is a many-sided concept. For the state whose official or 
national may be subject to prosecution by another state, universal jurisdiction does 
not advance its sovereignty, but is an affront to it. In response to Belgium’s zealous 
pursuit of universal jurisdiction cases, the ‘Universal Jurisdiction Rejection Act’ was 
introduced into the US House of Representatives, declaring in its Preamble that 
universal jurisdiction ‘is an assault on the internationally accepted concept of state 
sovereignty’ and based in part on the position that ‘[i]mplicit within the very concept 
of universal jurisdiction is a threat to the sovereignty of the United States’.64 The 
Bill was not ultimately passed, though it was part of a series of initiatives by the US 
that led Belgium to roll back the reach of its universal jurisdiction legislation. It goes 
                                                      
58 L. Douglas, The Right Wrong Man (2016), 37. 
59 Indeed, even in the case of asylum seekers who are prosecuted, ‘[i]t is not clear that the fact of having 
prosecuted such an individual will undercut the basis for their non-removability’ where outweighed by 
likelihood of persecution if returned to their country of origin: Joseph Rikhof, ‘Prosecuting Asylum 
Seekers Who Cannot Be Removed: A Feasible Solution?’ 15 Journal of International Criminal Justice 97 
(2017), at 112.   
60 Gareth Evans, Ministerial Statement, ‘Government Response to Menzies Report on Nazi War 
Criminals’, 24 February 1987, available at 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansard
s%2F1987-02-24%2F0035%22.   
61 Hetherington and Chalmers, supra note 55, at [9.18].  
62 Ibid. 
63 Langer, ‘Universal Jurisdiction is Not Disappearing’ 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2015) 245, 
at 249. 
64 ‘H.R. 2050 – 108th Congress: Universal Jurisdiction Rejection Act of 2003’ (9 May 2003), §2(14), available 
at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hr2050.  
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too far to say that universal jurisdiction has nothing to do with sovereignty. 
However, it cannot explain the principle’s foundation. 
 
2. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTIONS AS INTER-STATE COMITY (INTER-
STATE COMMUNITY) 
 
A justification that does more to accommodate inter-state relations is the inter-state 
comity approach. According to this account of universal jurisdiction, the exercise of 
jurisdiction is justified based on the fact it advances the interests of the community 
of states considered collectively. The seminal universal jurisdiction crime of piracy 
has been justified on such grounds. For as long as jurisdictional principles have 
existed, any nation could try any pirates it caught, regardless of the pirates’ 
nationality or where on the high seas they were apprehended.65 This recognition of 
universal jurisdiction resulted from the perceived need for inter-state cooperation, 
or ‘sea-policing’, to stem a common threat to ‘the commercial interests which 
needed protection against those dangerous common enemies’.66 To qualify as 
piracy, the plunder must take place on the high seas – that is, outside the territorial 
waters of any state. It is this factor that provides the primary motivation for vesting 
universal jurisdiction over piracy. As recognised in Oppenheim, ‘[p]iracy in 
territorial coastal waters has as little to do with International Law as other robberies 
within the territory of a State…Piracy is, and always has been, a crime against the 
safety of traffic on the open sea, and therefore, it cannot be committed anywhere 
else than on the open sea’.67 While the crime is to some extent a relic of a previous 
era, the policy has persisted because ‘[n]otwithstanding the more effective policing 
of the seas in modern times, the common interest and mutual convenience which gave rise 
to the principle have conserved its vitality as a means of preventing the recurrence 
of maritime depredations of a piratical character’.68 
 The problem with this account is that it has the effect of significantly narrowing 
the boundaries of universal jurisdiction. Treaty provisions recognising universal 
jurisdiction over terrorism, drug trafficking and potentially other transnational 
crimes can be justified on this basis (though notably there is no question that 
universal jurisdiction exists over such crimes in customary international law). 
However, it is another thing to extend such a justification more broadly to ‘modern’ 
incarnations of universal jurisdiction in relation to crimes with their origins, not in 
state rights, but in human rights. It is a common move to recognise piracy as the 
                                                      
65 Eugene Kontorovich, ‘The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation’ 45 
Harvard International Law Journal (2004) 183, at 190.  
66 Harvard Research in International Law, ‘Draft Convention on Piracy with Comments’ (Harvard Draft) 
36 Supplement, American Journal of International Law (1932) 749, at 711, 764-5. 
67 A.D. McNair, Oppenheim’s International Law (4th ed, 1928), Sec. 277. 
68 Harvard Draft, supra note 66, at 552. 
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obvious progenitor to the modern extension of universal jurisdiction to crimes such 
as genocide, crimes against humanity and, indeed, torture.69 The pirate – the original 
hostis humani generis – is commonly regarded as part of an unbroken genealogy related 
in turn to the modern genocidaire, the despotic perpetrator of crimes against 
humanity or torturer. As the Second Circuit of the US Court of Appeals stated in 
Filártiga: ‘the torturer has become – like the pirate and slave-trader before him – 
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind’.70 In the Eichmann case, the Supreme 
Court held that ‘the substantive basis underlying the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction in respect of the crime of piracy also justifies its exercise in regard to the 
crimes with which we are dealing in this case’.71 The Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction (described by one scholar as ‘a sort of “Restatement” of 
universal jurisdiction’)72 describe piracy as ‘crucial to the origins of universal 
jurisdiction’.73  
 However, closer examination reveals that the foundations for universal 
jurisdiction over piracy are quite different from those supporting universal 
jurisdiction over genocide.74 As Judge Moore determined in the Lotus case, ‘Piracy 
by law of nations, in its jurisdictional aspects, is sui generis’.75 The essential distinctive 
characteristics of piracy were (1) commission on the high seas (2) by persons who 
reject state or other equivalent authority.76 Importantly, in the case of piracy, it is 
not the heinousness of the conduct that attracts universality: as made clear in 
Oppenheim’s statement above, it was never imagined that piracy committed in 
territorial waters would be subject to universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction 
over piracy is granted out of necessity to protect fundamental state interests (namely, 
international trade) against perpetrators who routinely act outside state boundaries 
with no connection to a state. The contrast between piracy and crimes to which 
universal jurisdiction has more recently been extended is clear. Crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and torture are committed within the boundaries 
of sovereign states and, very often by definition, are committed by public officials 
or in the exercise of state policy. Universal jurisdiction in its modern incarnation has 
not developed out of the need to protect and preserve state structures and interests, 
                                                      
69 See, for example, Bassiouni, ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives 
and Contemporary Practice’, 42 Virginia Journal of International Law (2001) 81, at 108, 151-2; Joyner, 
‘Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to accountability’ 
59(4) Law and Contemporary Problems (1996) 153, at 166, 171; Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to 
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime 100 Yale Law Journal (1991) 2537, at 2556-7; 
Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction under International Law’ 66 Texas Law Review (1988) 785, at 788, 798; 
Cowles, ‘Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes’ (1945) 32(2) California Law Review 181; 
Schwarzenberger, International Law and Totalitarian Lawlessness (1943), 92, 98-99. 
70 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala 630 F. 2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980), at [54]. See also In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. 
Supp. 544, 556 (N.D. Ohio 1985). 
71 Supreme Court of Israel, AG v Eichmann, 36 ILR 28, [12]. 
72 Kontorovich, supra note 65, at 185. 
73 ‘Commentary to the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction’ in S. Macedo, Universal Jurisdiction: 
National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law (2004), 30.  
74 Kontorovich, supra note 65. 
75 Lotus Case, supra note 45, at 70 [249]. 
76 W. Blackstone, ‘Of Offences against the Law of Nations’, in Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 
IV, Chap 5, at 71. 
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but is a novel (and still controversial) means to penetrate and disrupt the machinery 
of state where it acts contrary to certain fundamental norms.  
 Rather than a device to preserve inter-state comity, it is instead arguable that 
one of the objects of universal jurisdiction is to disrupt inter-state comity, enabling 
states to prosecute certain offences even over the objection of the territorial state 
or state of nationality.77 As Justice Story observed in relation to an attempt to assert 
universal jurisdiction in United States v La Jeune Eugenie, ‘rarely can a case come before 
a court of justice…more likely to excite the jealousies of a foreign government, 
zealous to assert its own rights’.78 The significance of this realisation is twofold. 
First, by recognising that universal jurisdiction is not exercised in the service of inter-
state comity, the fact that its exercise interferes with inter-state relations should not 
be a basis for its rejection, but merely a factor to be weighed in the balance in 
determining whether the exercise of universal jurisdiction is proportionate to other 
legitimate state aims.79 Secondly, it is clear we must look elsewhere to understand 
its motivating rationale. 
 
3. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AS ‘CONSCIENCE OF HUMANITY’ 
(INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY) 
 
Ultimately, it makes little sense to explain universal jurisdiction in terms of 
sovereignty or inter-state comity. Rather than trying to shoehorn the principle into 
a traditional state-centred account, it makes more sense to see universal jurisdiction 
as part of a broader shift recognising a rival account of the international.80 It is 
common to hear universal jurisdiction explained on the grounds that certain 
international crimes are so heinous that they ‘shock the conscience of humanity’ 
such that those who commit them are truly hostis humani generis (in the sense of 
enemies of humanity, rather than enemies of the state as in the case of pirates or 
terrorists), justifying the idea that anyone may exercise jurisdiction over them.81 In 
her report on the Eichmann trial, Hannah Arendt spoke forcefully of the need to 
treat crimes against the comity of nations and crimes against the human status as 
distinct. For similar reasons, she also staunchly defended the need to distinguish the 
                                                      
77 Henry Kissinger, ‘The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001, at 86.  
78 26 F. Cas. 832, 841 (D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).  
79 For example, legal principles in immunity and extradition law are available to mitigate the impact of 
universal jurisdiction on inter-state comity. 
80 Dorsett and McVeigh, supra note 1, at 119. 
81 For example, the Princeton Principles present universal jurisdiction as a tool for vindicating ‘the 
fundamental interests of the international community as a whole’: supra note 53, at 23. See also See also 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble and Art 5; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes 
Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1999); Abi-Saab, ‘The Concept of International Crimes and 
its Place in Contemporary International Law’ in J. Weiler, A. Cassese and M. Spinedi (eds), International 
Crimes of States: A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (1989) 141, 147; Supreme 
Court of Israel, AG v Eichmann, 36 ILR 28, at [10] (1962). 
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crime of murder from the crime of genocide: ‘[t]he point of the latter is that an 
altogether different order is broken and an altogether different community is 
violated’. Arendt agreed with philosopher Karl Jaspers that ‘the verdict can be 
handed down only by a court of justice representing all mankind’.82 Though Arendt 
and Jaspers considered that only an international court would do in the case of 
crimes against humanity, others have defended the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
in such cases as a form of de-centralised enforcement of universal values, wherein 
the domestic courts of a particular state stand in for the international community.83  
 It is appropriate to view this account of universal jurisdiction as a contemporary 
one, forming part of a broader movement to re-imagine the concept of sovereignty 
in international law. It is an account, less related to the tradition of piracy, and more 
related to emerging doctrines and frameworks such as international human rights 
law, international criminal law and even the responsibility to protect doctrine, which 
envisages a responsibility on the part of the international community to protect 
populations from egregious human rights abuse by their own governments. Taking 
a longer view, it signals a return to a notion of non-territorial or ‘universal authority’ 
that potentially has deeper historical roots than (what we think of as) the ‘traditional’ 
notion of sovereignty. Anne Orford reminds us that medieval legal thought was 
shaped by the idea that the Holy Roman Emperor and Pope claimed authority as 
supranational bodies descended from the Roman Empire, and both alleged that this 
legacy gave them universal jurisdiction, understood as the power to state what is 
lawful for the whole world.84 The demise of the Holy Roman Empire and triumph 
of the modern state did not mark the end of a competition between ‘universal’ 
jurisdiction and state sovereignty, but rather recognition that state sovereignty was 
more effective at ensuring effective protection of the safety of the people. Even the 
father of legal positivism, Thomas Hobbes, recognised that this interpretation of 
sovereignty, entailing an obligation on subjects to obey the sovereign, would last ‘as 
long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them’.85 
 Events of the twentieth century provided an emphatic rebuttal of the 
presumptive link between state sovereignty and protection of the population. 
However, the grip of sovereignty over contemporary international law has been 
slow to release. The conscience of humanity having been pricked by the state-
deployed barbarism of the Holocaust and Second World War, states formed an 
international organisation charged not only with ‘developing friendly relations 
between states’, but also with ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms’. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 
by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, was one of the early 
                                                      
82 For Arendt and Jaspers, only an international court would do: ‘[i]nsofar as the victims were Jews, it was 
right and proper that a Jewish court should sit in judgment; but insofar as the crime was a crime against 
humanity, it needed an international tribunal to do justice to it’: Arendt, supra note 34, at 269. 
83 Mégret, ‘The "Elephant in the Room" in Debates About Universal Jurisdiction: Diasporas, Duties of 
Hospitality and the Constitution of the Political’ 6(1) Transnational Legal Theory (2015) 89, at 93. 
84 Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Responsibility to Protect’ 
30(3) Michigan Journal of International Law (2009) 981, 988. 
85 Hobbes, Leviathan (1996) (original ed. 1651), 147, cited in Orford, ibid., at 990. 
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instruments to invoke the ‘conscience of mankind’ to explain the development of 
international legal principles to regulate the relationship between a state and 
individuals within its jurisdiction.86 Still, there was no discernible shift from state to 
international jurisdiction. As David Luban has argued, ‘there was something anti-
cosmopolitan about Nuremberg’.87 Though US Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson 
opened the trial at Nuremberg observing that ‘the real complaining party at your bar 
is civilization’,88 the Nuremberg tribunal recognised its authority based, not on 
universal jurisdiction, but on the territorial jurisdiction of the occupying powers.89 
The Genocide Convention, adopted in 1948, did not recognise universal jurisdiction 
over genocide. While the Convention clearly envisages a form of international 
jurisdiction, it only places an obligation to prosecute on the territorial state.90 It is 
clear from the travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention that most states were 
strongly opposed to the idea of providing universal jurisdiction over genocide at the 
time of the Convention’s drafting.91  
 The position has changed gradually over the decades.92 It is clear that the 
international legal order can no longer be understood as based exclusively on state 
sovereignty. The international legal order is progressively moving from a 
sovereignty-centred to an individual-oriented system.93 Yet, as Christian Tomuschat 
recognised in his Hague Academy lectures, ‘[t]he transformation from international 
law as a State-centred system to an individual-centred system has not yet found a 
definitive new equilibrium’.94 As international law bequeathed state jurisdiction, so 
                                                      
86 See also UN General Assembly Resolution 96(1) (11 December 1946).  
87 Luban, ‘The Legacies of Nuremberg’ 54(4) Social Research (Winter 1987) 779, cited in Simpson, 48. As 
Cassese recognized, the Nuremberg Tribunal was not set up for the victims of crimes, but was ‘created 
primarily to try Axis war criminals for the crimes committed against the Allied Nations and their 
nationals’: Cassese, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Human Rights’ 
4 European Human rights Law Review (1997) 329-352, 330. 
88 The French Chief Prosecutor also invoked the conscience of mankind regularly in his pleadings, which 
‘evolved from his status as a human being’ (367, 371, 387, 406, 422). 
89 International Military Tribunal, Judgment of 1 October 1946, 218.  
90 Preamble and Article VI, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 
December 1948, 78 UNTS 277. 
91 States including Egypt, France, the Soviet Union, UK and the US opposed the principle of universal 
jurisdiction during the drafting process and an Iranian amendment proposing universal jurisdiction was 
rejected 29 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions. Algeria, Burma and Morocco made express reservations to the 
Convention affirming their opposition to universal jurisdiction. See further Paolo Gaeta, The UN Genocide 
Convention: A Commentary (2009). 
92 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, [31]; ECtHR, Jorgic v Germany, Appl. No. 
74613/01, Judgment of 12 July 2007, at [68]; Judgment, Prosecutor v Furundžija, (IT-95-17/1-T), Trial 
Chamber, 10 December 1998, at [156]. 
93 Anne Peters, ‘Humanity as the ∂ and Ω of sovereignty’ (2009) 20 EJIL 513; Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law 
(OUP 2011); Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System (2011); Decision on Jurisdictional 
Appeal, Prosecutor v Tadic (IT-94-1-T), Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995 at [97]. 
94 C. Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century’, 
Recueil des Cours (1999) 281, at 162. 
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in turn are states beginning to bequeath international law with a form of 
international jurisdiction. However, it is a development that has not yet been fully 
realised. This is a development that has its source in natural law, rather than positive 
state action, and is undermined by difficult problems that also afflict the natural law 
account.  
 One basic problem is that the relevant community, that of humanity, has not 
yet adequately established its existence, let alone its parameters.95 As far as laws 
should express the political will of a people, ‘there is no such people as humanity’.96 
The interests of ‘humanity’ are difficult to quantify in legal terms, let alone define. 
As Luban notes, the very idea of ‘humanness’ is deeply suspect and ultimately ‘too 
contestable to anchor our intuitions about what makes humans special – all the more 
if these intuitions are supposed to be shared across confessions and cultures’.97 
Ideals such as ‘humanity’ is ultimately a category of very little shape that can give 
rise to irresolvable normative controversies. Those who rely on humanity as the 
basis of jurisdiction often draw the related implication that the relevant crimes are 
somehow extrinsic to it; that perpetrators of such crimes are ‘enemies of humanity’. 
This ignores irrefutable and important evidence that even the most heinous crimes, 
such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, find their source within 
rather than outside humanity. In Adolf Eichmann, Hannah Arendt saw, not an 
inhuman monster, but ‘the déclassé son of a solid middle class family’, with ‘the 
personality of a common mailman’, certified by the psychologists who examined 
him as ‘normal’, ‘more normal, at any rate, than I am after having examined him’.98 
As Mahmood Mamdani reminds us, close on the heels of priests and doctors as 
prime enthusiasts of the Rwandan genocide were teachers, doctors and even some 
human rights activists’.99 Famous experiments demonstrate that individuals subject 
to relatively mild pressure to carry out brutal commands will do so in relatively high 
numbers, even where this conflicts with their sincerely-stated moral convictions 
expressed outside the situation.100 Treating these crimes as alien to humanity does 
not engender greater understanding of their causes or assist in their future 
deterrence. 
 The second basic problem with this model lies in its weak explanatory force. 
This account simply does not explain in any holistic fashion what states do. While 
the Eichmann case has been described as a ‘major precedent’ for universal 
jurisdiction, it is difficult to find many examples of cases that have actually followed 
it.101 Practically, there is scant evidence that the driving force behind universal 
                                                      
95 Ibid., at 126. M. Bourquin, L’etat souverain et l’organisation internationale (1959), at 17.  
96 Luban, supra note 41, at 126. See also Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’ 6 Max 
Planck UN Yearbook 1, at 11.  
97 Luban, supra note 41, at 109. 
98 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), at 145, 25. 
99 M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda (2002), at 171.  
100 Luban, ‘The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience’ in D. Rhode (ed), Ethics in Practice: Lawyers’ Role, 
Responsibilities and Regulation (2000), at 94; Luban, ‘Integrity: its Causes and Cures’ 72 Fordham Law 
Review 279 (2003). 
101 R. Teitel, Humanity’s Law (2011), at 53. 
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jurisdiction is state zeal to vindicate the concerns of humanity’s conscience. As 
Frédéric Mégret notes, ‘humanity’ largely fails to tell us why universal jurisdiction is 
used in some cases and not others, ‘a decision that must surely be based in 
something else than pure universalist good citizenship’.102 Itamar Mann determines 
rightly that any theory of universal jurisdiction must explain ‘the gap between the 
symbolic recognition that a crime has been committed and the ignition of 
prosecutorial action’.103 The gulf between theory and practice renders this account 
vulnerable, in turn threatening to undermine the principle of universal jurisdiction 
as artificial and therefore illegitimate.104  
 That is not to say that the ‘conscience of humanity’ can never exist as a 
foundation for universal jurisdiction. However, as things stand, in order for this 
practice to gain normative traction, this form of universal jurisdiction requires the 
service of Robert Cover’s ‘daring’ judge (or indeed daring investigator, prosecutor 
or legislator) to perform the difficult tightrope act of shifting the law from becoming 
to being.105 The current position is that, at best, any principle of universal 
jurisdiction based on the conscience of humanity is a narrow one. The heinousness 
of the crimes must be severe indeed in order to ‘shock the conscience of mankind’ 
sufficiently to vest universal jurisdiction. In the rare example in which such 
jurisdiction was recognised on this basis, the Supreme Court in the Eichmann trial 
determined that universal power was vested in every state to prosecute Eichmann’s 
crimes on the basis that ‘[n]ot only are all the crimes attributed to the Appellant of 
an international character, but they are crimes whose evil and murderous effects 
were so widespread as to shake the stability of the international community to its 
very foundations’.106 While recognition of jurisdiction based in humanity raises the 
traditional ceiling of jurisdiction, it also raises the floor.107 In Pinochet (No 3), Lord 
Millett recognised a distinction between ‘widespread and systematic use of torture 
as an instrument of state policy’ and ‘isolated and individual instances of torture’, 
recognising that only the former would attract universal jurisdiction under 
customary international law.108 What is clear is that, where a domestic court 
exercises this form of universal jurisdiction, the community it acts on behalf of is 
‘humanity’, perhaps more commonly referred to as the ‘international community’, a 
                                                      
102 Mégret, supra note 83, at 94.  
103 Mann, ‘The Dual Foundation of Universal Jurisdiction: Towards a Jurisprudence for the "Court of 
Critique"‘ 1(4) Transnational Legal Theory (2010) 485, at 489. 
104 Mégret, supra note 83, at 94. 
105 Cover, ‘The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction’, 14 Capital University Law Review (1985) 179, at 
191. 
106 Eichmann, at [12]. See also Brennan J and Toohey J in Polyukhovich, [34], [35].  
107 This language of a jurisdictional floor and ceiling is borrowed from Mills, supra note 49, at 209-10. 
108 Lord Millett. 
  
Devika Hovell                                 The Authority of Universal Jurisdiction  
 
 23 
political community whose interests may differ from that of the community of 
states, the community of victims or any particular state or individual.109  
 As the survey of universal jurisdiction trials discussed below reflects, there has 
been a recent upsurge in cases in which domestic courts could be said to be 
conducting prosecutions on behalf of the international community, rather than at 
the behest of domestic or inter-state communities, with Germany, Sweden, Finland, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Israel each completing trials commenced 
on this basis. The recent upsurge in such cases comes on the heels of the 
establishment of specialised War Crimes Units in a variety of states.110 The creation 
of these specialised units brings together the necessary resources, staff and expertise, 
enabling more focused and effective investigation and prosecution of grave 
international crimes.111 In a novel development, Germany has taken this a step 
further and has become the first state to initiate ‘structural investigations’ that focus 
not on specific suspects, but on whole situations or conflicts. Given the large 
number of refugees escaping conflicts, Germany has recognised a unique 
opportunity through cooperation between immigration and criminal justice 
authorities to be proactive in gathering information and evidence and identifying 
potential victims and witnesses for future criminal proceedings. This stems from a 
recognition that it is easier to collect evidence during the conflict or soon after the 
events as opposed to years later.112 Since 2011, the office of the federal prosecutor 
is thought to have opened several structural investigations, though the only publicly-
known examples are those relating to Libya and Syria. In the Syrian investigation, 
German authorities have been alerted to more than 2800 crimes committed in Syria, 
taking testimony from 200 witnesses, leading to the initiation of 22 investigations 
against 28 suspects.113 Two German nationals have already been tried and 
imprisoned for war crimes committed in Syria114 and universal jurisdiction trials 
have been commenced against at least two others.115 Germany’s motivations in 
launching such structural investigations are not domestic or inter-state, but 
                                                      
109 Princeton Principles, supra note 53, at 23. 
110 These countries include Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Denmark and 
the United Kingdom have personnel dedicated to grave international crimes within larger units handling a 
range of international crimes, including terrorism and financial crimes: Human Rights Watch, The Long 
Arm of Justice: Lessons from Specialized War Crimes Units in France, Germany and the Netherlands (September 
2014), available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/IJ0914_ForUpload.pdf. 
111 Ibid., at 6. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Deutscher Bundestag (German Parliament), Kleine Anfrage der Abeordneten Katja Keul, Tom 
Koenigs, Dr. Franziska Brantner, Luise Amtsberg, Marieluise Beck (Bremen), Britta Haßelmann, Renate 
Künast, Monika Lazar, Konstantin von Notz, Omid Nouripour, Claudia Roth (Augsburg) und der 
Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Inquiry), BT-Drucksache 18/12288, 5 May 2017 at 2-3. 
114 The trials of Aria L and Abdelkarim El B are discussed in Kroker and Kather, ‘Justice for Syria? 
Opportunities and Limitations of Universal Jurisdiction Trials in Germany’, EJIL Talk! (12 August 2016), 
available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/justice-for-syria-opportunities-and-limitations-of-universal-
jurisdiction-trials-in-germany/.  
115 See further details in reports from Trial International: ‘Suliman Al-S’ (2 August 2017), available at 
https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/suliman-al-s/ and ‘Ibrahim Al-F’ (23 May 2017), available at 
https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/ibrahim-al-f/.  
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international. Information gathered is earmarked for use, not merely in domestic 
courts, but in other countries or before international criminal tribunals and paves 
the way for enhanced international cooperation and mutual legal assistance in 
bringing suspects to justice.116 Germany may be the only country to have launched 
these structural investigations, but it establishes a model for other states wishing to 
serve the interests of a broader international fight against impunity to follow. The 
EU Genocide Network, established in 2002 as a network of investigators and 
prosecutors from member states to increase cooperation in cases of grave 
international crimes, has the potential to strengthen legal developments along these 
lines, already serving as a valuable forum for national investigators and prosecutors 
to develop additional expertise, share best practices and exchange information on 
specific cases.117 
 
4.UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AS ACCESS TO JUSTICE (VICTIM 
COMMUNITY) 
 
One of the main problems with these standard accounts of universal jurisdiction is 
that they proceed from ‘grand narratives’ rather than working with the 
contemporary practice of universal jurisdiction.118 If we allow ourselves to break out 
of traditional interpretations of jurisdiction, and indeed universal jurisdiction, we 
give ourselves licence to consider what actually drives universal jurisdiction 
prosecutions. An important revelation of my survey of universal jurisdiction trials 
over recent decades was to provide a window into the role of victim communities 
and victim-support organisations as key agents motivating the passage of universal 
jurisdiction statutes, preparing case files and galvanising prosecutions. The insight 
is that the exercise of universal jurisdiction is primarily victim-driven.119 States are 
not by and large valiant global enforcers of individual criminal accountability for 
international crimes, either individually in defence of domestic or international 
interests or out of a sense of comity to each other. Indeed, as Michel and Sikkink 
note in the Latin-American context, since human rights violations usually involve 
crimes committed by state officials, the state very often has a conflict of interest 
                                                      
116 Human Rights Watch, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 60. 
117 The Genocide Network comprises national authorities from Member States of the European Union 
and their counterparts from Canada, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. It also liaises closely 
with representatives of the European Commission, Eurojust, Europol, the ICC and ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpol and civil society organisations. 
See website at http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/Practitioners/Genocide-Network/Pages/Genocide-
Network.aspx.  
118 Mégret, supra note 83, at 92. 
119 This was also one of Luc Reydams’ conclusions: Reydams, supra note 8, at 221. 
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when it comes to human rights prosecutions.120 For the most part, states are 
pressured into commencing universal jurisdiction prosecutions by victims or victim-
support groups who fight for individual criminal accountability within states or 
sometimes globally.121 Organisations such as the Simon Wiesenthal Centre (Jewish 
human rights organisation), the Collectif des Parties Civiles pour le Rwanda, 
Association for International Justice in Rwanda, Advocacy Forum (Nepal), the 
Association of the Victims of Crimes and Political Repression in Chad, the 
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, the International Truth 
and Justice Project (Sri Lanka), sometimes assisted by global human rights 
organisations such as the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, 
the Féderation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme and Human Rights 
Watch, have as part of their mandate the initiation and support of litigation against 
perpetrators of international crimes. Getting a case off the ground is almost 
invariably a process of inter-dependence between state authorities and victims, with 
the latter very often bearing the burden of initiating the complaints and providing 
authorities with essential information, including the location of the suspect, the 
nature of the accusations and the names of potential witnesses living in the host 
state or overseas.122 
Despite the significant role of victims in initiating and sustaining universal 
jurisdiction prosecutions, it is clear that the legal framework is presently structured 
so that state interests not merely outweigh but trump the interests of victims of 
international crimes. The recent Nait-Liman judgment issued by the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights is one in a line of cases demonstrating 
that, while the legitimate aims of states in declining jurisdiction are well understood, 
the aim or aims in recognizing universal jurisdiction are not.123  Though the Nait-
Liman case concerned universal civil jurisdiction rather than universal criminal 
jurisdiction, it remains instructive.  In brief, the case concerned the refusal by Swiss 
courts to examine the applicant’s civil claim for compensation arising out of his 
alleged torture in Tunisia in 1992 on the orders of A.K., the then Tunisian Minister 
of the Interior. The applicant was a Tunisian national, who fled to Switzerland in 
1993 where he was granted political asylum and eventually Swiss citizenship. Relying 
on Article 6§1 of the Convention, the applicant alleged that the refusal by the Swiss 
courts to examine his civil claim infringed his right of access to a court. By a strong 
                                                      
120 Michel and Sikkink, ‘Human Rights Prosecutions and the Participation Rights of Victims in Latin 
America’ 47(4) Law and Society Review (2013) 873, at 874.   
121 In the universal jurisdiction context, it is less apparent that the motivating force is the ‘abstract victim’ 
described by Nouwen in her critique that ‘the victims that are the alpha and omega of the international 
criminal justice movement are not concrete persons of flesh, blood and water, with individual names 
and individual opinions, but deity-like abstraction that is disembodied, depersonified, and most of all, 
depoliticized’: ‘Justifying Justice’ in J. Crawford and M. Koskenniemi, The Cambridge Companion to 
International Law (2012), at 340. 
122 African Rights and REDRESS, Survivors and Post-Genocide Justice in Rwanda: Their Experiences, Perspectives 
and Hopes (November 2008), 78, available at 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Rwanda%20Survivors%2031%20Oct%2008.pdf.  
123 ECtHR, Nait-Liman v Switzerland, Application No 51357/07, Judgment of 21 June 2016. 
                  
              
8/2018 
 
 26 
majority, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights rejected his 
application, holding there had been no violation of Article 6§1. 
In this case, the Court had the potential to render a judgment clarifying the 
appropriate balance between the legitimate concerns of states arising out of the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction and the legitimate interests of victims of 
international crimes in obtaining access to justice. Instead, the Court structured the 
proportionality analysis in such a way that state interests did not merely outweigh, 
but essentially displaced those of victims. As is widely recognised, the core of the 
proportionality doctrine is the balancing stage which requires the right in question 
to be balanced against competing rights or interests.124 No such balancing occurred 
in the present case. Instead, while acknowledging it was clear the applicant’s right 
of access to justice had been restricted, the Grand Chamber recognized that 
limitations on this right would be lawful if (1) the limitations pursued a legitimate 
aim; and (2) the limitations deployed were reasonably proportionate to achievement 
of that aim. As can be seen from the way the Court structured the analysis, the 
interests of individuals in achieving access to justice were not weighed in the balance, 
but instead dropped from the equation entirely.  
In applying the test, the only interests considered by the Court were state 
interests. In terms of ‘legitimate aims’, the Court was satisfied that the impugned 
restriction was justified in the interests of ‘the proper administration of justice and 
maintaining the effectiveness of domestic judicial decisions’. Specifically, it accepted 
Switzerland’s contention (without seemingly engaging in any independent inquiry) 
that an action such as the applicant’s would pose considerable problems in terms of 
evidence and enforcement, would encourage forum shopping by victims of torture 
leading to an ‘excessive workload for domestic courts’ and would entail potential 
diplomatic difficulties in terms of Swiss/Tunisian relations.125 Turning to the 
question as to whether the restriction was proportionate, the Court’s sole concern 
was whether other legal obligations existed which bound Switzerland to open its 
courts to the applicant, including inter alia a principle of universal civil jurisdiction 
for torture.126 In reasoning to its decision that no such obligations existed, including 
                                                      
124 Möller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’, 10(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 
(2012) 709, at 710; Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’, 65(1) Cambridge Law Journal 
(2006) 174, at 176; Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Irrationality’ 16(2) Ratio Juris (2003) 131. 
See also Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35, at 52.  
125 Ibid., paras 122-128. 
126 Notably, this was not a case like Al-Adsani where there was a conflicting principle of international 
law (for example, state immunity), which prohibited access to a court in the relevant circumstances. In Al-
Adsani, the Court’s reasoning was subtly different where the Court appeared to infer a presumption of 
proportionality on the basis that ‘measures taken by a High Contracting Party which reflect generally 
recognised rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing 
a disproportionate restriction’: Al-Adsani v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 273 (ECHR 2001), para 56. 
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under the law relating to universal civil jurisdiction, the Grand Chamber assumed 
the perfect judicial poise from a positivist perspective. Referring to Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Court held that the question was 
whether Switzerland was bound to recognize universal civil jurisdiction for acts of 
torture by virtue of an international custom, or of treaty law. In terms of custom, 
the Court concluded that ‘those States which recognize universal civil 
jurisdiction…are currently the exception’.127 The Court further held that 
international treaty law ‘also fails to recognize universal civil jurisdiction for acts of 
torture, obliging the States to make available, where no other connection with the 
forum is present, civil remedies in respect of acts of torture perpetrated outside the 
State territory by the officials of a foreign State’.128 On this basis, the Court held that 
‘the Swiss courts’ refusal to examine the applicant’s action seeking redress for the 
acts of torture to which he was allegedly subjected pursued legitimate aims and was 
not disproportionate to them’.129 In other contexts, the European Court of Human 
Rights has appropriately favoured an interpretive approach encouraging consistency 
between principles of international law, yet has generally used this approach as a 
means to bring other legal regimes more into line with human rights law.130 By 
contrast, in the case of the right of access to justice for victims of torture, the Court 
clearly considered the human rights muscle was not strong enough to swim against 
the tide of state interests 
The role of human rights law in international criminal trials is appropriately 
contested, particularly to the extent that overplaying the rights of victims can 
interfere with the criminal defence rights of the accused.131 However, when it comes 
to determining the scope of jurisdiction of domestic courts, the relevant contest is 
not between the victim and the accused,132 but between the rights of states and the 
rights of victims.133 The legal interest of victims in the prosecution of international 
crimes is recognized,134 and must be balanced against the competing interests of 
states. Here, the human rights framework provides an effective balancing 
                                                      
127 Nait-Liman, supra note 123, para 187. 
128 Ibid., para 188. 
129 Ibid., para 217. 
130 Golder v United Kingdom, (1979) 1 EHRR 524 (ECHR 1975), para 35; Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland, 
[2010] ECHR 1053, paras 131-133; Nada v Switzerland, para 169; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary, 
Application No 18030/11 (ECHR 2016), para 138. 
131 Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Law’, 21(4) Leiden Journal of International Law (2008) 925. 
132 Among the rights of defence recognized, there is no suggestion that the accused has the right to 
choose the legal jurisdiction to which he or she is subject, or to choose the forum in which he or she is 
prosecuted.  
133 Cécile Aptel talks about the need for prosecutors of international crimes to serve ‘two constituencies’, 
the victims of the crimes and states: ‘Prosecutorial Discretion at the ICC and the Victims’ Right to 
Remedy’, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) 1357, at 1373-1375. 
134 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, GA Res 
60/147 (16 December 2005); Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res 55/89 (4 December 
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mechanism. The problem is that, where human rights judges serve merely as a 
handmaiden to state will, they risk becoming complicit in injustices perpetrated by 
states against individuals.135 It is clear that some courts continue to think of 
jurisdiction as a state prerogative based in state sovereignty. In this article, I have 
sought to show that such framing perpetuates an outdated conception of 
jurisdiction. To construe universal jurisdiction as an aspect of sovereignty serving 
primarily domestic interests, or an act of inter-state comity catering predominantly 
to the interests of other states, or even as an act of international conscience is to 
misconstrue the self-evident position that universal jurisdiction is most often 
exercised at the behest of and in the interests of victims. Recognition of a normative 
shift from jurisdiction as a state right to recognition of jurisdiction in some 
circumstances as an individual right would not be revolutionary. To a large extent, 
it merely maps onto the jurisdictional terrain the long-standing recognition that 
international law is no longer merely concerned exclusively with state rights, or 
obligations owed between states, but is also concerned with human rights, or 
obligations owed to individuals. As Alex Mills recognizes, what is perhaps more 
surprising is that much of the work on jurisdiction has been quarantined from these 
developments for so long.136 In his article on ‘Rethinking Jurisdiction in 
International Law’, Mills contrasts the ‘relatively static’ account of the rules of 
jurisdiction with fundamental changes in international law, in particular through the 
recognition of individuals as bearers of human rights.137 He acknowledges the 
traditional view of jurisdiction as a state right, but introduces the notion that failure 
to exercise jurisdiction could deny an individual’s right of access to justice. He argues 
that this individual right has implications for the idea of jurisdiction in international 
law, implying that ‘jurisdiction is no longer exclusively a right of states, but is at least 
to some extent a matter of individual right, that is, an obligation owed to 
individuals’.138 Mills concludes that international rules on jurisdiction are ‘ripe for 
reconceptualisation’ so as to reflect the shift in the status of individuals from passive 
objects of international jurisdictional rules to active rights-holders.139  
 
Frédéric Mégret disrupts the notion, central to the Court’s determination in 
Nait-Liman, that this state obligation owed to individuals to provide access to justice 
                                                      
135 Judge Dedov’s dissent in Nait-Liman includes a section on ‘Positivism as a dark side of international 
law’. In relation to the majority’s emphasis on the need for international consensus, he notes that ‘the 
slaves…waited 3,000 years for international consensus…[where the] concept de lege ferenda rendered this 
process as drawn-out as possible’ (pp 73-75).   
136 Mills, supra note 49, at 212. 
137 Ibid., at 188. 
138 Ibid., at 229. 
139 Ibid., at 235. 
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should be interpreted narrowly. In Nait-Liman, the Grand Chamber accepted the 
determination by Swiss courts that there was no sufficient connection to 
Switzerland, despite the fact of the victim being a Swiss national, on the basis that 
the victim’s obtaining of Swiss nationality was ‘a fact subsequent to the events of 
the case’.140 Mégret reconceptualizes the geography of access to justice, recognizing 
that the body of the victim ‘describes the “place” of crime much better than, say, 
the territory of a state’.141 He recognizes the role of ‘victim diasporas’ in the evolving 
practice of universal jurisdiction, who ‘“bring the crime” to the forum state, sensitise 
it to its existence and, often, demand some form of recognition’. He identifies the 
‘long tail’ of mass crime, and the capacity for diasporas to ‘reconstitute in the forum 
country some of the very tensions and polarities that were characteristic of the state 
of origin, and therefore some of the conditions that created criminality’.142 Mégret’s 
argument is not that the right of access to justice should be geographically unlimited. 
Rather, he exposes the deception that universal jurisdiction is invariably exercised 
by a state with no connection to the crime, observing that universal jurisdiction 
‘almost always follows existing patterns of transnational interaction between 
states’.143 In response, Mégret proposes a normative theory of universal jurisdiction 
that takes seriously the role of diasporas in precipitating exercises of universal 
jurisdiction. He proposes reframing universal jurisdiction as an exercise in creating 
a safe, welcoming, hospitable society and – building on Kant’s universal duty of 
hospitality – imagines the contours of a ‘transnational right to an effective 
remedy’.144 
I concur with Mégret’s conclusion that a state’s exercise of universal 
jurisdiction has the potential to provide a mechanism through which to provide 
victims of international crimes with a right of access to justice. As recognized in the 
European human rights context, this right is not absolute, however it should be 
strong enough to place a burden on states declining to exercise jurisdiction to 
demonstrate that an exercise of universal jurisdiction would disproportionately threaten 
other legitimate aims and state interests in any particular case. Just as importantly, 
this proportionality analysis also provides a formula through which states can 
justifiably limit the scope of universal jurisdiction. For example, many states include 
a condition that the accused must be present on their territory, a limitation that 
could be justified on the basis ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’ places a 
                                                      
140 By contrast, the Court did not consider itself foreclosed from referring to subsequent developments in 
the Tunisian political and justice system. While noting the impossibility of lodging an action in Tunisia 
at the relevant time, the Court included a section on ‘Subsequent developments’ in which it noted that, 
following the ousting of Ben Ali’s regime in the 2011 revolution, a Truth and Dignity Commission was 
established in 2013, giving victims of the former regime until 15 June 2016 to apply to the 
Commission. The Court further noted that ‘it was foreseen that selected cases would be transmitted to 
the courts at a later stage in the investigation process’: Nait-Liman, supra note 123, paras 31-36. 
141 Mégret, supra note 83, at 100. 
142 Ibid., at 106, 100. 
143 Ibid., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 99. 
144 Ibid., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 106-112. 
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disproportionate burden on the justice system relative to the limited sense of justice 
for the victim. The effect of my argument is to bring into question Roger O’Keefe’s 
persuasive thesis that the category of ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’ mistakenly 
elides the distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction.145 My 
argument is that greater understanding of the aims of universal jurisdiction will have 
implications for the principle’s legitimate scope and limitations. Stephen Ratner’s 
insightful analysis of Belgium’s universal jurisdiction prosecution of the Butare Four 
concludes that the trial’s benefits to human rights and public order outweighed its 
costs, attributing its success to a number of factors including the presence of the 
accused, the strength of the evidence against them and the absence of an effective 
judiciary in the place the atrocities took place.146 The UK has also made an attempt 
to identify relevant factors to be weighed in the balance in determining whether to 
assume extra-territorial jurisdiction, including notably the vulnerability of the victim 
rendering it particularly important the offences are prosecuted and the danger that 
such offences would not otherwise be prosecuted.147 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this article is to draw attention to the claim to authority inherent in the 
exercise by domestic courts of universal jurisdiction. To do so is to underscore that 
the judicial authority exercised in universal jurisdiction trials derives from a distinctly 
different source than that exercised in domestic criminal trials. Where a foreign 
national is prosecuted for a crime that has no connection to the prosecuting state, a 
positivist claim to authority by the prosecuting authority expressed purely in terms 
of its domestic law comes off as parochial and unconvincing. Moreover, by carrying 
on with ‘business as usual’, a domestic court risks disregarding the distinctive 
purpose of the trial and the normative communities most closely affected by it. This 
article recounts that sovereignty, inter-state comity and the conscience of humanity 
have all been proposed as justifications for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
However, on the basis of a detailed survey of universal jurisdiction trials and a 
critical interrogation of traditional accounts, I propose a shift in theoretical 
                                                      
145 O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
735 (2000).  
146 Ratner, ‘Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Post-Mortem’ 97 American Journal of International Law 
888 (2003). 
147 Other factors included (1) seriousness of the offence; (2) availability of witnesses and evidence; (3) 
international consensus as to the reprehensible nature of the crime; (4) impact on standing and 
reputation of the UK: UK Home Office, Review of Extra-territorial Jurisdiction: Steering Committee Report 
(1996). 
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paradigm, at least for what is termed ‘modern universal jurisdiction’.148 While the 
foundation of universal jurisdiction trials may differ depending on the nature of the 
crime, universal jurisdiction is best understood as based in an individual’s right of 
access to justice for victims of serious international crimes. This insight is important, 
not only because of its descriptive accuracy, but also because of its normative 
implications.149 With greater awareness of the purpose and community served by 
universal jurisdiction trials, courts can be more responsive to important questions 
of normative and institutional design, including the constitution of the jury, issues 
of translation, the significance of non-governmental organisations, the importance 
of public judgment, the role of victims and the geographical reach of the ‘public’ 
gallery. The question of jurisdiction is not merely a preliminary question to be 
disposed of, but is a question that should orient, inform and influence the entire 
trial and its conduct. All parties to the trial, including authorising government 
officials, barristers and domestic judges must take responsibility for the authority 
claimed in such trials and the normative communities it puts into relation. 
Otherwise, courts such as the Old Bailey in the Kumar Lama trial, risk becoming 
just another site where – in an age of internationalism – staunch reliance on local 
road maps results in global disorientation.  
 
 
 
  
                                                      
148 Kontorovich, supra note 65. 
149 Mills, supra note 49, at 237. 
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APPENDIX150 
 
State Domestic: 
Primary 
Motivation 
(Secondary) 
Inter-state: 
Primary 
Motivation 
(Secondary) 
International:  
Primary 
Motivation 
(Secondary) 
Victim: 
Primary 
Motivation 
(Secondary) 
TOTAL 
Australia   1 (1) 1 
Austria  (1)  1 1 
Belgium    4 4 
Canada   1 2 3 
Denmark    1 1 
Finland (3) (1) 3 1 4 
France    5 5 
Germany 2  4(1) 1 7 
Israel   (1) 2 2 
The 
Netherlands 
3 1(1) 1 2 7 
Norway  (2)  2 2 
Senegal   (1) 1 1 
Spain   1  1 
Sweden  (2) 6(1) 2 8 
Switzerland    2 2 
United 
Kingdom 
  2 1(2) 3 
TOTAL 5(3) 1(7) 19(4) 27(3) 52 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
150 The survey deals only with universal jurisdiction trials that proceeded through to a verdict between 1961 
and December 2017: 52 cases were identified. Based on publicly available information, the aim was to 
identify the primary community (and secondary if relevant) motivating the initiation of each prosecution, 
classifying the relevant communities as domestic community, inter-state community, international 
community and victim community. Sources checked in compiling the survey include the websites for Trial 
International and the International Crimes Database, relevant articles and books, including in particular 
Antonio Cassese (ed), Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), L. Reydams, Universal 
Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (2004) and Langer, ‘The Diplomacy of Universal 
Jurisdiction’, 105 American Journal of International Law (2011) 1; reports on universal jurisdiction by Amnesty 
International, European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, the Féderation Internationale des 
Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, Human Rights Watch and REDRESS; newspaper articles and other media 
reports.  
